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WHO WAS WATCHING WHOM?  
A REASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT  
BETWEEN GERMANICUS AND PISO 
Fred K. drogula

Abstract. Despite Tacitus’ insinuations to the contrary, Cn. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 
7 b.c.e.) was no friend and loyal supporter of Emperor Tiberius. The emperor 
offered Piso the command of Syria in an effort to win over the political support 
of this prestigious-but-recalcitrant senator. As a safeguard should Piso attempt 
something treacherous in this powerful command, Tiberius gave Piso the province 
at a time when Germanicus Caesar—the emperor’s loyal adopted son and heir—
would be in the East resolving a number of economic problems in the eastern 
provinces. Thus Piso was not sent to watch the prince, but to be watched by him.
oF all the roman senators who held provincial commands 
in the early empire, few are more famous and better documented than 
Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso (cos. 7 b.c.e.), the proconsul of Syria who gained 
notoriety for his conflict with Germanicus Caesar, the nephew, adopted 
son, and heir-apparent of the reigning emperor Tiberius. Germanicus was 
holding supreme command over the Roman East with imperium maius 
from 17 to 19 c.e., but Piso was openly insubordinate and treated the 
prince with great disrespect. Although Germanicus endured this behavior 
for a while, he finally asserted his superior authority and humbled the 
proconsul, driving Piso to abandon his Syrian command altogether. When 
the prince died from illness shortly afterwards, Piso had the audacity to 
rejoice publicly at his death and tried to reclaim possession of Syria by 
force, raising a ragtag army and starting a civil war that was quickly crushed 
by the Roman legions under the command of Germanicus’ lieutenants. 
Forced to return to Rome, Piso was accused of many crimes, including 
poisoning the prince, and he took his own life when his condemnation 
seemed certain. Tacitus reports this infamous conflict between the prince 
and Piso in his Annales (2.43.1–3.19.2), but the discovery of the senatus 
consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre—the official senatorial record of Piso’s 
trial and punishment—has made Piso a particularly interesting subject 
of inquiry to historians because it provides both a corroboration of Taci-
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tus’ account and new information not found there.1 Because the senatus 
consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre (henceforth, SCPP) complements and 
expands upon Tacitus’ description of Piso’s trial and posthumous pun-
ishment, modern scholars have recently focused their research on what 
happened to Piso after he returned to Rome from his command in Syria.2 
This article will address a different topic that is not well explained 
by the SCPP: why was Piso chosen for the Syrian command in the first 
place? At first glance, this question seems easily answered, since Tacitus 
clearly wishes his readers to believe that Tiberius chose Piso as an agent 
and co-conspirator in a plan to suppress Germanicus’ popularity and 
ambitions, and perhaps even to kill the young prince (Tac. Ann. 2.43.2–6, 
2.77.3, and 3.16.1). Although modern scholars generally dismiss part of 
Tacitus’ conspiracy theory—the suggestion that Tiberius wished to harm 
his adopted son—it is still widely accepted that Piso was the trusted friend 
and agent of the emperor, and that Tiberius sent Piso to Syria to keep 
an eye on Germanicus and to prevent the prince from taking any rash 
action (such as invading Parthia).3 Yet this position rests on startlingly 
weak evidence—mainly on Tacitus’ inclusion of unfounded rumors and 
unsupported (and even misleading) innuendos in his work. The weakness 
of this evidence is disturbing, especially since—if one looks past these 
shadowy hints of conspiracy—there is a great deal of evidence in Tacitus’ 
text that refutes the insinuation that Piso was a friend and agent of the 
emperor. Thus Tacitus presents his readers with a contradiction, since 
his innuendo that Piso was Tiberius’ friend and agent seems disproven 
by his clear statements that Piso held the emperor in low regard and 
wanted nothing to do with the imperial house. Piso was so obviously a 
bad choice as governor of Syria that only a secret conspiracy can provide 
a plausible motive for Tiberius’ choice, but Tacitus undermines even this 
possibility by giving ample evidence that Tiberius had no reason to trust 
Piso or choose him as a co-conspirator. Something in Tacitus’ account 
of this affair is not right, and it centers on why Piso was selected for the 
governorship of Syria. 
1 On the discovery and text of the senatus consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre, see Eck 
et al. 1996. For additional commentary, including references to scholarly work since the 
1996 publication by Eck et al., see Lott 2012, 254–311. For an English translation of the 
senatus consultum, see Meyer 1998.
2 See recent work, including Griffin 1997; Richardson 1997; Barnes 1998; Cooley 1998; 
Flower 1998; Bodel 1999; Damon 1999; Flower 1999; González 1999; Lebek 1999; Potter 
1999; Talbert 1999; Severy 2000; Eck 2002; MacKay 2003; Fishwick 2007.
3 E.g., see Syme 1939, 424; 1986, 373; Shotter 1974, 231; Levick 1999, 154; Rapke 1982; 
Bird 1987; Wells 1992, 100; Shotter 2004, 27, 41–42; Seager 2005, 37–38; Robinson 2007, 70.
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4 A similar suggestion was first proposed by Beesly 1878, 125–26, and reiterated and 
expanded upon by Rapke 1982. In their view, the empress Livia Augusta—who was a good 
friend of Piso’s wife Plancina—prevailed upon her son Tiberius to give Piso the Syrian 
command. This idea seems implausible, however, because Piso’s disrespectful, insubordi-
nate, and even hostile behavior towards members of the imperial house undermines the 
possibility that he recognized them as his patrons or benefactors. Not once did Piso act 
like a man who had received a favor from the emperor. Rather, he acted like a man who 
believed himself robbed of things due to him. 
Tacitus demonstrates clearly that Piso was no loyal friend and 
supporter of the emperor, so another motive is needed to explain his 
appointment to the governorship of Syria. The evidence suggests a very 
good explanation: Tiberius hoped to win over Piso’s political support by 
offering him the highly desirable, status-enhancing command of Syria. 
In doing this, Tiberius was following the example of Augustus, who had 
sought to win over the support of nobiles and to use their Republican 
names and auctoritas to unify the state and to adorn and legitimize his 
rule. Cn. Piso was a particularly prestigious nobilis with a solid Republican 
pedigree, but his support for Tiberius was tepid at best, and he had even 
criticized the emperor publicly before the senate. Since Tiberius was still 
new as emperor and had encountered difficulties upon his succession, 
winning over the influential Piso with the inducement of a desirable 
province was a shrewd political tactic. There was some risk in giving this 
unpredictable senator command over the powerful army in Syria, but 
Tiberius had a safeguard: his adopted son and heir Germanicus was to 
be given an extraordinary command in the East to deal with a range of 
important fiscal and administrative problems.4 This would allow Piso to 
govern Syria with a free hand, but Germanicus would be close enough to 
observe the governor’s actions and to intercede if he detected treachery. 
Despite Tacitus’ efforts to portray Tiberius as jealous or fearful of his 
nephew, the emperor had no reason to doubt Germanicus’ loyalty, and 
in fact he had good grounds to expect that the prince would defend the 
imperial house against any challenge by Piso. Although the personalities 
of the two men ultimately led to open conflict, it may nevertheless have 
been the case that Piso was sent to Syria not to watch Germanicus, but 
rather to be watched by the prince.
Piso is not merely interesting as a governor because his activities 
are so well documented; he is interesting because he was an incredibly 
bad choice for the governorship of Syria—probably the worst choice 
Tiberius ever made for a provincial command. His shortcomings became 
obvious immediately: en route to Syria, he denounced Germanicus in a 
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5 Tacitus reports a rumor (Ann. 2.70.2–3) that Germanicus ordered Piso out of the 
province, but this is contradicted by the SCPP (28–29, 47–49), by Suetonius (Cal. 3.3), and 
by Tacitus himself (Ann. 2.69.1). The SCPP in particular blames Piso for abandoning his 
province, which suggests that Piso was unable to offer any justification for this action, such 
as having been ordered out of the province by Germanicus. Goodyear 1981, 2.407–8, 427, 
believes that Germanicus probably dismissed Piso, since otherwise Germanicus’ lieutenants 
would not have been able legally to prevent Piso from returning to Syria after the prince’s 
death, but this assumes Germanicus’ friends acted in accordance with the letter of the 
law. Since Germanicus’ friends had long hated Piso (Tac. Ann. 2.57.2), and they may have 
believed that Piso had poisoned the prince (Tac. Ann. 2.71.1), it would be unsurprising if 
they ignored Piso’s legal claim to the province.
6 Cf. Tacitus’ clear and straightforward report of Tiberius’ complicity in the death 
of Postumus Agrippa (Ann. 1.6.1–3): “The first act of the new principate was the slaughter 
of Postumus Agrippa . . . [Tiberius] was pretending there were orders from his father . . . 
[Tiberius and Livia] had speeded the slaughter of a suspected and resented young man.” 
I use Woodman’s translation of Tacitus throughout this article.
fiery speech to the Athenians, he was ungrateful when the prince saved 
his life during a storm at sea, he relaxed the discipline of the legions and 
tampered with their loyalty to the emperor, he ignored or disobeyed 
direct orders from Germanicus, he showed the prince open contempt and 
disrespect at public functions, and he even countermanded the orders 
given by the prince to the legions and cities in Syria (SCPP 38, 52–53; 
Tac. Ann. 2.53.3, 55.1–6, 57.1–4, 69.1). When Germanicus finally asserted 
his greater authority over the arrogant governor, Piso decided to aban-
don his province rather than fulfill his responsibilities as governor (Tac. 
Ann. 2.69.1–2).5 When the prince grew ill and died a short time later, 
Piso rejoiced publicly at the news and tried to reclaim the governorship 
of Syria forcibly by starting a civil war against Germanicus’ lieutenant 
Cn. Sentius Saturninus (SCPP 37, 45, 57–62; Tac. Ann. 2.69.1–2, 75.2, 
78.1–81.3). When his insurrection was crushed and he returned to Rome, 
he held celebrations during a period of mourning for the emperor’s son 
(Tac. Ann. 3.9.2–3). Even allowing for some exaggeration by Tacitus, 
Piso was clearly a terrible choice for the command of Syria, which begs 
the question of why such a disrespectful and insubordinate senator was 
selected for the command of Syria in the first place.
Tacitus had an answer to this conundrum: Piso was an agent of the 
emperor and in league with him against Germanicus. Of course, he avoids 
making this claim in his own voice. Whereas he freely records other of 
Tiberius’ (alleged) crimes as simple facts,6 Tacitus keeps his references to 
this supposed plot between Tiberius and Piso vague and equivocal, and 
relies almost entirely upon hearsay and rumors to convince his readers. 
He writes, for example, that Piso “had no doubt” that he had been given 
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7 Ann. 2.43.4–6: nec dubium habebat se delectum qui Syriae imponeretur ad spes 
Germanici coercendas. Credidere quidam data et a Tiberio occulta mandata; et Plancinam 
haud dubie Augusta monuit aemulatione muliebri Agrippinam insectandi (“nor did he have 
any doubt that he had been selected for installation in Syria to curb Germanicus’ hopes. 
Certain people believed that secret instructions had been given to him by Tiberius; and 
without doubt Augusta warned Plancina in womanly rivalry to assail Agrippina.”). See 
Goodyear 1981, 2.324. 
8 Hardie 2012, 284–313, passim gives a good and recent discussion of rumor as a 
literary device in ancient writers, including a discussion of Tacitus’ use of rumor. On his 
use of rumor and innuendo to guide or manipulate his reader’s perception of events, see: 
Ryberg 1942; Mierow 1943, 153–55; Shatzman 1974; Sullivan 1975–6; Whitehead 1979; 
Develin 1983; Gibson 1998. Goodyear 1981, 2.325, simply dismisses most of Tacitus’ innu-
endos, and Woodman and Martin 1996, 117, discuss how Tacitus obfuscates information 
that appears clear in SCPP. 
Syria in order to frustrate Germanicus’ ambitions, and that “certain people 
believed” the emperor had given Piso secret instructions to work against 
the prince, and that “without doubt” the empress Livia (Tiberius’ mother) 
had instructed Piso’s wife Plancina to attack Germanicus’ wife Agrippina 
“in womanly rivalry.”7 Tacitus also makes Piso’s friend Domitius Celer 
claim in a private conversation that Piso had the support and complicity 
of Tiberius and Livia, and Tacitus later reports that older generations 
spoke of a document in Piso’s possession proving that Piso was follow-
ing the emperor’s orders, although he pointedly declines to assert the 
veracity of this rumor himself (Ann. 2.77.3, 3.16.1; see Suet. Tib. 52.3). 
While this repetition of rumor and hearsay seems substantial, none of it 
amounts to reliable evidence on the nature of Piso’s assignment; rumor 
was a common literary device in ancient authors, and many scholars have 
written on Tacitus’ use of rumor and innuendo to guide or manipulate 
his reader’s understanding of events, including his use of rumors to cre-
ate impressions or provide unverifiable evidence.8 Thus Tacitus reports 
(Ann. 3.2.3, 11.2) that the nameless mob suspected Tiberius’ guilt in the 
death of Germanicus, but this tells us nothing except that a particular 
rumor—which may or may not have been accurate—may have been 
floating around a city that was full of rumors. This environment of rumor 
and uncertainty gives us a good impression of what life in imperial Rome 
may have been like, but on their own such rumors cannot be taken as 
convincing evidence of Tiberius’ guilt. Our hesitance to accept such flimsy 
evidence should be increased by our knowledge that Tacitus was not a 
neutral reporter; it is well known that he disliked Tiberius and sought to 
vilify him using unsubstantiated rumors and innuendos, and in particular 
that he intentionally contrasted the older emperor with the youthful, 
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9 Ann. 1.33.1–3, where Tiberius is shown in a very negative light when compared to 
Germanicus, and 1.62.2, where Tacitus suggests that Tiberius may have interpreted every-
thing Germanicus did—no matter how noble—in a negative light. 
10 Germanicus is portrayed as having great difficulty restoring the discipline in rebel-
lious legions in 14 c.e. (Ann. 1.34.1–52.3), and the description of his German campaigns 
the following year does not hide his tactical mistakes (1.55.2–71.3). The legions try to make 
Germanicus emperor (1.31.1, 35.3); Germanicus was the greatest threat to Tiberius’ acces-
sion (1.7.6–7); Tiberius was afraid of Germanicus (1.52.1). Kelly 2010, 231, gives a good 
summary of modern views about Tacitus’ representation of Germanicus in the Annales.
11 Ann. 2.42.2–43.1; SCPP 31–36. The kingdom of Cappadocia had just been incor-
porated into the Roman Empire and needed to be organized and subjected to a new tax; 
the kings of Commagene and Cilicia had died and there was uncertainty about how their 
kingdoms should be governed in the future (most of the inhabitants wanted Roman rule); 
and the provinces of Judaea and Syria were economically distressed and asking for tax 
relief. For a discussion of Germanicus’ command, see Koestermann 1958.
energetic, and popular Germanicus.9 Although he did not suppress the 
prince’s shortcomings, Tacitus went to great lengths to portray Tiberius 
as jealous and fearful of his dynamic and well-loved stepson, so it is to 
be expected that Tacitus would strive to link the emperor to the man 
accused of the prince’s death.10 Whether or not Piso was actually guilty 
of murder, his villainy had been pronounced by the senate and publicized 
throughout the empire by the SCPP. Linking Tiberius in friendship and in 
conspiracy to the disgraced and hated Piso was one more way for Tacitus 
to attack the character of the emperor, but his dependence upon rumor 
and innuendo to insinuate this link indicates that no better evidence 
existed. There is, therefore, little reason to believe Tacitus’ insinuation 
of a conspiracy in the first place, and further examination reveals good 
grounds for rejecting the idea. 
Beyond the heavy use of rumor and hearsay, the impression that 
Piso was an agent of the emperor, and that he had been selected because 
he could oppose Germanicus, emerges primarily from the way Tacitus 
describes the provincial commands assigned to Germanicus and Piso in 
17 c.e. (Ann. 2.42.2–43.6). In Tacitus’ presentation of the events, a number 
of serious organizational and economic problems in the East required the 
attention of a member of the imperial house, so—at Tiberius’ request—
the senate assigned to Germanicus a broad command that comprised all 
the provinces “across the sea” (that is, east of the Adriatic) and greater 
imperium than any other commander except the emperor, whose impe-
rium remained the greatest.11 This special assignment for a member of 
the imperial family was not unusual; Augustus had frequently sent men 
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12 Gaius Caesar was sent to hold command of the Danube in 1 b.c.e. (Dio 55.10.17), 
but Augustus soon decided to send him to the East instead, where he died while holding a 
wide-ranging command similar to that given to Germanicus (Vell. 2.102.2–3; Tac. Ann. 1.3.3; 
Dio 55.10.18). Lucius Caesar was en route to take up a special command in Spain when he 
died in 4 c.e. (Vell. 2.102.3; Dio 55.10a.9). Tiberius commanded Rome’s army in Armenia 
in 20 b.c.e. (Suet. Aug. 21.3; Tib. 9.1) and its northern armies from 12 to 7 b.c.e., and from 
4 to 12 c.e. (Vell. 2.104.3–4; Dio 54.31.3–4, 55.28.5). For discussion, see Seager 2005, 21–37.
13 Tac. Ann. 2.43.2–3: tunc decreto patrum permissae Germanico provinciae quae 
mari dividuntur, maiusque imperium, quoquo adisset, quam iis qui sorte aut missu prin-
cipis obtinerent. Sed Tiberius demoverat Syria Creticum Silanum, per adfinitatem conexum 
Germanico, quia Silani filia Neroni vetustissimo liberorum eius pacta erat, praefeceratque 
Cn. Pisonem, ingenio violentum et obsequii ignarum . . . vix Tiberio concedere, liberos eius 
ut multum infra despectare. 
in his family to important commands throughout the empire.12 Immedi-
ately after reporting Germanicus’ command, Tacitus next describes Piso’s 
assignment to the province of Syria in a way that compels the reader to 
interpret his appointment as a direct consequence of Germanicus’ assign-
ment to the East: “But Tiberius had removed from Syria Creticus Silanus, 
who was connected with Germanicus by marriage (Silanus’ daughter had 
been betrothed to Nero, the eldest of his children), and had placed in 
charge Cn. Piso, temperamentally violent and a stranger to compliance, 
with the innate defiance of his father . . . he scarcely yielded to Tiberius 
and looked down on the man’s children as greatly beneath him.”13 These 
words are intended to make the reader assume that Piso’s assignment 
was subsequent to—and motivated by—Germanicus’ new command; not 
only is the emperor’s choice of Piso for Syria described immediately after 
the senate’s conferral of the eastern command on the prince, but Tacitus 
also describes Silanus and Piso primarily by their respective relation-
ships with Germanicus: Silanus is identified as a relation (and therefore 
a probable supporter) of the young prince, whereas Piso is specifically 
described as looking down on Germanicus. By describing these men here 
only by their relationship to Germanicus, Tacitus creates the unavoidable 
impression that Silanus was removed because he was a relation and ally 
of the prince, whereas Piso was appointed as his successor because he 
loathed the prince and was certain to be rude and uncooperative. No other 
provincial appointments are described here, so Tacitus makes this passage 
focus on friends and enemies of Germanicus, rather than on the distribu-
tion of provincial commands. Told in this way, Tacitus practically compels 
his reader to understand that the change in the Syrian governorship was 
a direct consequence of Germanicus’ eastern command, and that it was 
done because the emperor wanted the prince’s enemy—rather than a 
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14 Thus Seager 2005, 82: “[Silanus’] daughter was betrothed to Germanicus’ eldest 
son Nero, and this connection was the only explanation men could find for his supersession 
at precisely this time.” Goodyear 1981, 2.324, summarizes it: Silanus “could respectably be 
replaced.” 
15 Rapke 1982, 61, argues to the contrary that it is impossible to determine the order 
of the provincial assignments. Goodyear 1981, 2.324, does not remark on Tacitus’ use of the 
pluperfect, but Koestermann 1958, 335–36, seems to accept that Piso’s assignment to Syria 
was subsequent to the senate’s conferral of a special eastern command on Germanicus. 
McCulloch 1984, 76, observes the use of the pluperfect in this passage and suggests that it 
reflects “Tiberius’ careful planning.” This is undoubtedly correct, but McCulloch does not 
address why Tacitus distorted the chronology of the provincial assignments in this section, 
or the effect this distortion has on the reader’s understanding of the motive behind Piso’s 
assignment to Syria. 
friend—in command of Syria. Thus the reader is left with no alternative 
explanation for Piso’s appointment14 and, therefore, with little choice 
but to imagine that Tiberius and Piso were in league together to make 
things very difficult for Germanicus in the East, a conception that Tacitus 
reinforces with rumors and innuendo. 
A closer look at this passage reveals Tacitus’ efforts to plant ideas 
of conspiracy in his readers’ minds. In particular, he has manipulated the 
sequence of events in this passage to arouse suspicion and imply that Piso 
was chosen to oppose the prince. Although Tacitus presents the appoint-
ment of Piso as a direct consequence of Germanicus’ receipt of his eastern 
command, his use of the pluperfect when describing Piso’s succession 
to Silanus demonstrates that Piso had already been assigned to Syria 
by the time Tiberius went before the senate to request an extraordinary 
command for the prince (“Germanicus was entrusted with the provinces 
that are separated by the sea . . . but Tiberius had removed from Syria 
Creticus Silanus”).15 Thus Tacitus has reversed the sequence in which 
Germanicus and Piso received their provincial commands in his narrative, 
no doubt to create a false impression of the motive behind the choice 
of Piso. If Tacitus had described the events in their proper chronological 
order, with Piso’s assignment to Syria having been made public before 
Tiberius asked the senate for a special command for Germanicus, the 
reader would receive a very different impression of what had actually 
happened. Instead of taking on the appearance of a conspiracy, the two 
provincial assignments would barely seem connected: Piso had been made 
governor of Syria, and sometime later the prince was sent to resolve a 
number of economic problems in various eastern provinces—most of 
which had nothing to do with Syria. Whereas Tacitus’ telling of the event 
creates confusion and a suspicion of conspiracy (“why did the emperor 
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16 Dabrowa 1998, 17–30, points out that Silanus’ immediate predecessors had only 
served two or three years as governor.
17 Martin 1981, 141, points out, “There is no indication in Tacitus or anywhere else 
that Tiberius’ behaviour was motivated by regard or fear of either Germanicus or Drusus,” 
and Goodyear 1981 states clearly about Tiberius’ decision to send Piso as the governor 
of Syria under Germanicus: “there is no reason to see anything sinister here, and much 
of T.’s innuendo can be stripped away forthwith.” See also Mierow 1943, who argues that 
Tacitus deliberately misrepresented Tiberius as being hostile to Germanicus, and Seager 
2005, 82–83, who argues that Tiberius wanted to honor Augustus’ wish that Germanicus 
should be seen as Tiberius’ heir. 
send the clearly inappropriate Piso unless there was a plot against the 
prince”), the appointment of Germanicus after Piso creates no confu-
sion at all: there were extraordinary problems in the East that required 
a member of the imperial house, so the emperor sent his adopted son 
and heir with sufficient authority to resolve those problems. In this case, 
Silanus’ connection to Germanicus is not even relevant, since his return 
to Rome had been ordered before Tiberius requested a special command 
for the prince. Silanus had been the governor of Syria for at least six years 
when he was recalled to Rome, and after this long term in command, the 
appointment of a successor would not have appeared noteworthy, except 
that Tacitus manipulated his account of it to make it seem that Silanus was 
removed because of his relationship to the prince.16 Naturally, it must be 
assumed that Tiberius took the governorship of Syria into consideration 
when contemplating Germanicus’ eastern command; he may even have 
decided upon the two appointments at the same time, but announced 
them separately. Yet by presenting Piso’s appointment as a direct conse-
quence of the prince’s extraordinary command, Tacitus gives the reader 
the distinct impression that a conspiracy existed against the prince.
Tacitus tries to deepen his insinuation of a conspiracy by suggest-
ing as a motive that Tiberius was jealous and fearful of Germanicus, and, 
therefore, the emperor needed Piso to control and possibly kill the prince, 
but this too is baseless. Tiberius had no obvious motive for distrusting 
or conspiring against his stepson.17 It is true that Germanicus had repre-
sented the greatest potential threat to Tiberius’ succession upon Augustus’ 
death, but the prince had dispelled all suspicion by making a powerful 
and public show of loyalty to his uncle. When the legions in Germany 
offered to make Germanicus emperor following Augustus’ death, the 
prince adamantly defended his uncle’s rights, bound his supporters in 
an oath to support the emperor, and successfully brought the loyalty 
of the legions back to Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 1.31.1, 34.1–35.4, and 42.1–4). 
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18 Goodyear 1981, 2.325, and Seager 2005, 82–84, suggest that Tiberius may have 
feared that the eastern legions would become too loyal to the charismatic young prince, but 
Germanicus was not being sent to conduct military operations; he was, rather, to oversee 
economic and governmental reforms, so the time he would spend with the army was intended 
to be minimal (as actually was the case). On Germanicus’ activities, see Koestermann 1958.
19 SCPP 29–32, 38–39, 123–27. See also Eck et al. 1996, 166, 181–82, 250; Griffin 
1997, 260.
20 Tiberius rebuked Germanicus for his entry into Egypt but took no stronger mea-
sures to punish his adopted son for what was really a very serious violation. Of course, we 
cannot know what would have happened had Germanicus lived to return to Rome. Contra 
Koestermann 1958, 350–53, who sees Germanicus’ trip to Egypt as a sign that conflict was 
growing between the prince and his adopted father. Goodyear 1981, 2.378–79, agrees that 
Germanicus’ action seems like willful disobedience. For a discussion of the imperial policy 
of forbidding senators to enter Egypt without the emperor’s permission, see Drogula 2011.
Furthermore, Germanicus had sacrificed his own desire for personal glory 
in a significant demonstration of his loyalty to Tiberius; although he very 
much wanted to continue his German campaigns, he abandoned them 
and returned to Rome in obedience to his uncle’s summons (Tac. Ann. 
2.26.1–5). Tiberius’ confidence in his stepson was demonstrated by the 
many honors he showered on the prince: he gave Germanicus a triumph 
for his campaigns over the Germans, he gave the urban population a 
large donative in the prince’s name, he designated Germanicus to be his 
consular colleague in the next year, and he requested an extraordinary 
eastern command for the prince (Tac. Ann. 2.41.2–43.1).18 The SCPP not 
only stresses the emperor’s affection for the prince but also portrays 
these two men as united against the arrogant insubordination of Piso.19 
Although Germanicus would later offend Tiberius by entering Egypt 
without the emperor’s permission, the emperor’s castigation of him for 
this was surprisingly mild considering the seriousness of the offense (Egypt 
was strictly forbidden to all of Rome’s senatorial aristocracy, Tac. Ann. 
2.59.1–3).20 Nor was Germanicus’ military glory and popularity with the 
legions a source of concern to Tiberius, who had himself been the hero 
of those legions when he had served as Augustus’ leading general on the 
German frontier (Suet. Tib. 9.1–2, 16.1–19.1; Tac. Ann. 2.26.3). Tiberius 
had been Augustus’ loyal lieutenant and heir, and he knew the value of a 
reliable relative like Germanicus who was content to wait for his turn to 
rule. Thus there is little reason to suspect that the emperor was jealous or 
fearful of his adopted son, which further undermines Tacitus’ innuendo 
that Piso was selected to thwart Germanicus. 
While modern scholars generally disregard Tacitus’ suggestion that 
Tiberius wanted to have Germanicus killed, it is widely accepted—despite 
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21 Syme 1986, 373. See also Goodyear 1981, 2.325, who calls Piso “a man the princeps 
could hold as a personal friend of firm loyalty”; Shotter 1974, 235, cf. 1968, 205, noted that 
“Piso will have seemed an ideal replacement [for Silanus in Syria]; close to Tiberius, expe-
rienced, and not likely to be overawed by Germanicus’ authority”; Levick 1999, 154, writes 
of Piso that “his abilities may have been mediocre, and his temper ungovernable, but that 
fact was outweighed by his closeness to Tiberius and by his seniority. There is no need to 
doubt that he was sent to Syria to head Germanicus off from adventures that would not 
profit the Empire”; and González 1999, 130, suggests that “Tiberius chose his friend Piso 
to accompany Germanicus because, being a man of independent character, he would not 
easily submit to the decisions of Germanicus.” See also n. 3 above.
the meager evidence—that Piso was sent to Syria in order to keep an eye 
on the prince and to prevent him from doing anything rash. This view 
is based upon the assumption that Piso was a trusted supporter of the 
emperor, and that his loyalty and self-importance made him the ideal 
man to have in direct command of the Syrian legions, which Germanicus 
would need for any major military operation. Syme’s assessment is typical:
The task demanded a man who, even without benefit of active warfare, had 
at least held one of the military provinces. Moreover, not to be overawed 
by any prince . . . Tiberius looked for a resolute character and unswerving 
loyalty. The old friend was the answer . . . Piso understood the policy of 
the ruler and no doubt shared his distrust of Germanicus Caesar. Piso was 
appointed to act as an “adiutor” to the prince (Tiberius used that word). 
In truth to curb rather than to counsel. Men spoke of “secreta mandata.” 
They were right. The function of Caesar’s confidant and mandatory was to 
avert embroilment with the Parthians, counter intrigue with Roman vassals, 
take a firm grip on the legions in Syria.21
This view represents a partial acceptance of Tacitus’ conspiracy theory: 
it accepts that Tiberius and Piso were in cahoots to restrain the actions 
of Germanicus in the East, but it stops short of Tacitus’ insistence that 
the conspiracy was intended to harm the prince. There are, however, 
serious problems with accepting even this modified reading: problems 
of logic and reason, problems regarding the nature of the relationship 
between Piso and Tiberius, and problems in the history of the relation-
ship between Piso and Tiberius. In the first place, if Tacitus is correct that 
Piso was a man who was “temperamentally violent and a stranger to 
compliance, with the innate defiance of his father . . . fired by the nobility 
and wealth of his wife too . . . he scarcely yielded to Tiberius and looked 
down on the man’s children as greatly beneath him” (Ann. 2.43.2–4), it 
seems contrary to reason that the emperor would have sent such a man 
on a mission that required diplomacy, restraint, and judgment. Piso’s 
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22 Seager 2005, 83–84, remarks that it was “a situation in which trouble was virtually 
bound to arise.” There is no indication that Tiberius was careless in his appointment of 
legates; although he is said (Suet. Tib. 42.1) to have appointed Pomponius Flaccus to be the 
governor of Syria after a two-day drinking party, Flaccus was an old and trusted friend of 
the emperor and an experienced commander, and so—if this story is true—it shows Tiberius 
selecting a seasoned, reliable, and capable commander for the important province of Syria. 
23 Goodyear 1981, 2.363, points out that the honor of “parent of the legion” was 
generally reserved for the emperor at this time, and that Piso was “rash to have acquired 
[the title] at all.” See also Lott 2012, 277–79: “these titles [Pisonians and Caesarians] were 
evocative of civil war.”
arrogance and cruelty were well known: Seneca (De ira 1.18.3–6) records 
an episode in which Piso had three obviously innocent Roman soldiers 
executed simply to satisfy his own pride. Tiberius had had several prior 
opportunities to assess Piso’s character (see below), and it is difficult to 
believe that the emperor—who was an experienced commander and was 
surely concerned for the stability of his empire—would knowingly have 
selected such a disruptive and self-centered senator to act as a discreet 
and responsible check on Germanicus.22 Not just the emperor, but any 
informed senator would have known that Piso was the wrong man for 
the job. 
Second, Piso’s actions in Syria demonstrate very clearly that he 
was no friend and ally to the emperor. Upon taking up his command, 
Piso began tampering with the loyalty of the legions by relaxing military 
discipline, removing strict officers, promoting those loyal to him, giving 
donatives in his own name, allowing soldiers to call him the “parent of 
the legions,” and calling some soldiers “Pisonians” and others “Caesar-
ians” (SCPP 45–49, 54–56; Tac. Ann. 2.55.5–6, 3.13.2).23 None of this could 
have been pleasing to Tiberius, and it even seems treasonous. Piso then 
magnified his disservice to Tiberius by resorting to civil war in his efforts 
to reclaim Syria from Germanicus’ lieutenants. Although Piso probably 
believed it was within his rights to reclaim his command by force, he must 
have known that starting a civil war was contrary to Tiberius’ wishes and 
best interests, and this was indeed one of the most serious crimes with 
which he was subsequently charged (SCPP 45–48). Tacitus portrays Piso 
as solely concerned with his own self-interest in his efforts to recover 
the province, and the SCPP says that he believed that his arbitrium 
and potestas should direct all affairs in Syria (SCPP 36–37; Tac. Ann. 
2.70.1–2, 80.2). Tacitus’ innuendo that Tiberius and Piso were friends is 
directly contradicted by his depiction of Piso as giving remarkably little 
thought to protecting or promoting the interests of the emperor; Piso is 
portrayed as entirely self-motivated, he abandons Syria rather than stay 
133WHO WAS WATCHING WHOM?
24 Syme 1986, 373, calls Piso’s decision to leave Syria in the first place a dereliction 
of duty. For a recent discussion of the specific charges made against Piso in his trial, see 
Lott 2012, 268–82.
25 Since Piso had no authority at all beyond Syria (Goodyear 1981, 2.323), it is 
difficult to imagine how he could have exerted any influence on Germanicus, whose com-
mand encompassed the entire East, including Syria. Hurlet 1997, 195–97, even argues that 
Germanicus’ imperium maius marked him as a co-regent with the emperor. 
and attempt to influence the prince, and he takes actions that he surely 
knows will be displeasing to the imperial house.24 That Tiberius made no 
effort to defend or protect Piso in subsequent prosecution back in Rome 
is clear: Tacitus writes of the trial that Tiberius was implacable because 
of the civil war Piso had caused, and that the emperor had completely 
shut himself off to any possibility of appeal from his legate (Tac. Ann. 
3.14.3 and 15.2). While it is possible that Tiberius “abandoned” his loyal 
friend to the anger of the senate and people of Rome, the evidence more 
strongly suggests that there was no deep friendship between the two to 
start with, and that the emperor was enraged at Piso’s actions and was 
quite content for the senate to carry out its prosecution.
Third, it is not at all clear how Piso could have restrained Germani-
cus, who was a popular imperial prince, the great-nephew of Augustus, 
a two-time consul, a triumphator who had been sent to the East with 
 imperium maius and a vast provincia that included Syria, and was 
accompanied by loyal friends who supported his wishes and obeyed his 
commands even after his death. On what grounds, or with what authority, 
could Piso legally or even effectively prevent any action that Germani-
cus decided to pursue?25 Is it believable that—in any circumstance—the 
legions would have chosen to support the proconsul Piso over the imperial 
prince Germanicus Caesar, who was invested with imperium maius and 
was the heir-apparent of the emperor? Not at all: Piso did everything 
in his power to win the affection and loyalty of the Syrian legions, but 
when he sought to reclaim the province by force, those legions remained 
loyal to Germanicus’ lieutenant rather than side with their governor. In 
fact, Piso did not restrain or prevent any of Germanicus’ actions—he 
was a great annoyance, but he proved entirely incapable of hindering 
the prince in any way. Although on one occasion Piso did refuse to obey 
Germanicus’ instruction that he should send a detachment of soldiers 
to Armenia (Tac. Ann. 2.57.1), this defiance crumbled when the prince 
confronted the governor in person, and Piso quit his province rather than 
continue as an underling now proven to be impotent. Simply put: Tiberius 
had not given his Syrian governor the power to hinder the prince in any 
way. Perhaps the emperor imagined that Piso would guide Germanicus’ 
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26 Shotter 1974, 231. Syme 1986, 369, points out that Piso does not seem to have reached 
the consulship when first eligible, but had to wait a few years. Piso had been proconsul of 
actions through wise counsel, but if so, Piso was very obviously the wrong 
choice for this assignment, and Tiberius would have known this given 
Piso’s previous behavior (see below). Thus if Piso was sent to restrain 
Germanicus’ actions and ambitions, he was woefully ill-equipped for the 
task, having absolutely no way to complete this objective. 
Thus Piso lacked both the temperament to guide the prince by advice 
and the power to control him through force, which seriously undercuts the 
notion that he had been sent by the emperor to act as a check or monitor 
on Germanicus. The only remaining reason for suspecting that Piso was 
an agent of the emperor is the widespread belief that the two men were 
close friends (not just shallow, potential allies) and that Tiberius would 
not have assigned his proud friend the humiliating task of governing Syria 
as a subordinate to Germanicus’ imperium maius unless there had been 
a hidden agenda to control the prince. In other words, the assumption 
of a close friendship between governor and emperor makes one look 
for a deeper motive for Piso’s provincial assignment. As we shall see, 
however, the evidence that Piso enjoyed a real friendship with Tiberius 
is very meager, whereas there is extensive evidence showing that Piso 
was unfriendly and even antagonistic towards the emperor. 
Not even Tacitus can bring himself to claim that Tiberius and Piso 
were close friends, although doing so would have advanced his efforts 
to implicate the emperor in Piso’s crimes. In Tiberius’ address to the 
senate at the opening of Piso’s trial, Tacitus has the emperor refer to 
Piso as “his father’s legate and friend [who] had been given by himself, 
on the senate’s authority, to Germanicus as his helper in the administra-
tion of affairs in the East” (patris sui legatum atque amicum Pisonem 
fuisse adiutoremque Germanico datum a se, auctore senatu, rebus apud 
Orientem administrandis, Ann. 3.12.1). Thus while Tiberius describes Piso 
as Augustus’ amicus and Germanicus’ adiutor, he makes no particular 
claim of friendship with Piso for himself. This silence is striking: why does 
the emperor acknowledge Piso’s friendship with Augustus and not with 
himself (if such a friendship existed)? Furthermore, the statement that 
Piso and Augustus were friends is itself questionable, or at least should 
not be taken as signifying a particularly close bond: Shotter has pointed 
out that Piso’s proconsulship of a senatorial province came at the usual 
time in his career (that is, no special consideration was given), and that 
there was a hiatus of over a decade before he was offered command of 
an imperial province.26 In other words, Piso received no obvious benefit 
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Africa sometime between his consulship in 7 b.c.e. and the death of Lucius Caesar in 2 c.e. 
(PIR2 C 287; Sen. De ira 1.18.3–6). He was a legatus in Nearer Spain towards the end of 
Augustus’ reign (Tac. Ann. 3.13.1).
27 Crook 1975, 21–30; Winterling 1999, 161–94. See also Syme 1956; Hellegouarc’h 
1963, 41–51.
28 Rogers 1959, demonstrates that the renunciation of friendship (amicitiam renuntiare) 
was a public statement of displeasure and a suspension of friendly intercourse, but it did not 
necessarily mean that the two individuals involved had previously enjoyed a close friend-
from his supposed friendship with Augustus, which is surprising since 
one can imagine that Augustus would have advertised and promoted his 
friendship with a nobilis and scion of the Republic like Piso. Furthermore, 
Crook and Winterling have both argued that anyone given regular admit-
tance to the imperial salutationes could be counted among the emperor’s 
amici, and Suetonius (Aug. 53.2–3, 74.1) says that Augustus welcomed all 
senators to his salutationes.27 Taken together, this indicates that practi-
cally any senator could have been called an amicus of Augustus, causing 
Crook (1975, 25) to caution that: “merely to have shown that a man was 
an amicus is not to have discovered in him a counsellor of the emperor.” 
Saller (1982, 11–15, 61) also emphasizes that the terms amicus and amicitia 
encompassed a very broad range of social relationships, and that most 
amici of the emperor probably saw him only at morning salutationes and 
at dinner parties. Thus Tiberius’ description of Piso as Augustus’ amicus 
does not mean much by itself, and his failure to follow this up with a 
statement of his own friendship for Piso contradicts the assumption that 
they were true friends. 
Similarly, one should not make much of Tiberius’ statement that he 
would reject Piso and bar him from the imperial house if he had betrayed 
his duties and had rejoiced at the prince’s death (Tac. Ann. 3.12.2). While 
this may appear to suggest that Piso previously had enjoyed privileged 
access to the emperor, this was not the case. Suetonius (above) has shown 
that all senators generally had access to the emperor’s house under 
Augustus, and there is no indication that Tiberius immediately deviated 
from his stepfather’s practices. Access to the emperor, therefore, was not 
the same thing as friendship with the emperor. Since all senators were 
received at the imperial house at the time, it was far more significant to 
be banned from the imperial presence than it was to have access to him. 
This is demonstrated by Tacitus’ report (Ann. 2.70.2) that Germanicus 
on his deathbed renounced his friendship with Piso: no one can possibly 
imagine that they had been close friends previously, so Germanicus’ renun-
ciation of their friendship was simply a statement of official displeasure.28 
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ship. He gives (227) a particularly good example (Quint. Inst. 6.3.79): “Gaius  Proculeius, 
brother-in-law of Maecenas, forbade his home to Cassius Severus, the  acid-tongued ora-
tor; Severus made public reply, ‘I never go there anyway, do I?’” See also Lott 2012, 266.
29 Even Bird 1987, 74—who accepts that Piso and Tiberius were friends—points out 
that the amicitia referred to in Piso’s letter may have been only a political alliance and not 
a true affectionate friendship.
30 Rapke 1982, 62, looks at several examples and argues: “sharing a consulship with 
a son (or stepson in the case of Tiberius and Piso) of the Princeps conferred no special 
distinction or promise of favour or advancement.”
Of course, in Tacitus’ version of Piso’s suicide note (Ann. 3.16.3–4), Piso 
calls himself Tiberius’ friend and claims that he had been given the honor 
of holding the consulship of 7 b.c.e. with Tiberius because Augustus had 
approved of him, but this is highly dubious evidence. Not only does Tacitus 
confess that his text of Piso’s letter only “roughly” (ferme) followed the 
original, but the main purpose of Piso’s note was to implore clemency 
for his son, so it should not be surprising that Piso tried to solicit the 
emperor’s sympathy by claiming greater friendship and loyalty than was 
actually the case.29 
Furthermore, the mere fact that Piso and Tiberius were colleagues 
in the consulship does not demonstrate any friendship between them. It 
would have been Augustus (not Tiberius) who recommended Piso for the 
consulship, so any gratitude Piso felt (if there was any) would have been 
directed towards the man who arranged the honor, rather than towards 
the colleague who shared the honor. There is no reason to think that Piso 
and Tiberius were made consular colleagues because they were friends; 
political motives generally lay at the heart of consular assignments. In fact, 
Piso may not have appreciated being forced to share the consulship with 
a man who was (at the time) a lesser member of the imperial house.30 In 
7 b.c.e. Tiberius was (at best) third in line of succession to Augustus and 
was notoriously on bad terms with the emperor, so the honor of holding 
the consulship with him was not nearly as great as sharing office with 
the emperor or his appointed heir. Indeed, the self-important Piso may 
even have been insulted and angered by having to share his consulship 
with Tiberius, since the glory and attention Piso received as consul were 
probably much less than that given to his better-connected colleague. To 
someone like Piso, who was so proud of his own lineage that he “scarcely 
yielded” to the emperor (Tac. Ann. 2.43.3–4), sharing a consulship with an 
imperial prince may have been an unattractive “honor” because it meant 
being overshadowed during the pinnacle of his career. 
Finally, although Syme (quoted above) draws attention to the fact 
that Piso is called the “helper” (adiutor) of Germanicus (SCPP 29; Tac. 
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31 Velleius Paterculus refers to M. Vipsanius Agrippa and Statilius Taurus as adiutores 
to Augustus (Vell. 2.127.1); Velleius and Tacitus both refer to L. Aelius Sejanus as an adiutor 
to Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 4.7.1; Vell. 2.127.3).
32 Hellegouarc’h 1963, 88–89, and TLL 1.715.5ff. discuss the many different uses of 
the term adiutor. Regarding Tacitus’ use of the term at 3.12.1, Woodman and Martin 1996, 
141, suggest that adiutor was an official term, but regarding the appearance of the word in 
the SCPP, Eck et al. 1996, 157–58, argue “Adiutor bezeichnete eine nicht präzis definierbare 
Stellung.” Lott 2012, 272, also points out “there was no regular position of adiutor.” The 
word conveyed the abstract meaning of “helper” in the late Republic (Cic. Fam. 1.9.19; Caes. 
BC 3.62), and it may have meant nothing more than this here. See also Koestermann 1958, 
337; Woodman 1977, 253–54; Goodyear 1981, 2.325; Hurlet 1997, 380–413.
33 When Gaius Caesar had been given a special command in the East in 1 b.c.e., 
M. Lollius was assigned to advise him as comes et rector (Suet. Tib. 12.2) and as modera-
tor (Vell. 2.102.1), and in 2 c.e. he was replaced as rector by Sulpicius Quirinus (Tac. Ann. 
3.48.1). Goodyear 1981, 2.325, seems to conflate the adiutor with the titles comes, rector, 
and moderator, but he also points out that “Germanicus, of whose sapientia we have just 
heard, was no callow youth, like Gaius.” 
34 Although Tacitus makes Tiberius refer to Piso as Germanicus’ “helper in the 
administration of affairs in the East” ([adiutor] rebus apud Orientem administrandis, Tac. 
Ann. 3.12.1), this is probably a misleading statement. Piso was not an adiutor assigned to 
the prince’s concilium, but rather a legatus Augusti assigned to the province of Syria. Piso 
travelled to the East separately from Germanicus, and once he arrived he is not found in 
the company of the prince except when Germanicus entered Syria. Thus Piso had  nothing 
Ann. 3.12.1), this in itself says nothing about the nature of Piso’s relation-
ship with Tiberius, nor does it demonstrate that Piso was sent to Syria as 
a special advisor to the prince. The word adiutor is provocative because 
it was occasionally used to describe the emperor’s most senior allies and 
lieutenants (such as Agrippa, Statilius Taurus, and Sejanus), but this circle 
of men was exceedingly small, and nothing we know about Piso places 
him within this most-elite circle (he is not described as the emperor’s 
adiutor, merely the prince’s).31 In the late Republic, the term adiutor 
had conveyed the simple concept of “helper,” and it eventually came to 
signify a range of lesser offices in Rome’s bureaucracy, so the word does 
not in itself demonstrate that Piso was a trusted friend and agent of the 
emperor.32 While it is true that Augustus had occasionally assigned senior 
and experienced men as advisors to accompany young princes on special 
commands, such men were generally called rectores, not adiutores.33 Piso 
cannot have been such a rector—or any other type of advisor—because 
he was assigned to a different province from Germanicus and therefore 
was rarely present to give advice. Moreover, Germanicus was a much 
more experienced commander than Piso, and he was accompanied by 
his own council of advisors, so it seems impossible that Piso had any 
official role in Germanicus’ command.34 Thus Syme’s emphasis on the 
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to do with Germanicus’ eastern command except that he—like all eastern provincial 
 governors—was expected to obey the prince’s imperium maius if it was imposed upon him 
(see Eck et al. 1996, 157).
35 For a history of the Calpurnii Pisones, see Earl 1960; Forsythe 1994, 1–24; Hofmann-
Löbl 1996.
36 Piso’s great-uncle (C. Calpurnius Piso, cos. 67 b.c.e.) strongly opposed the lex 
Gabinia and refused to allow Pompey to recruit men and resources in Piso’s province of 
Cisalpine Gaul, despite the fact that the lex Gabinia specifically authorized Pompey to do 
so (Dio 36.24.3, 37.2; Plut. Pomp. 25.4, 27.2). Furthermore, in the debate over the Catilinar-
ian conspirators in 63 b.c.e., this Piso was said to have begged Cicero to implicate Caesar 
(falsely) in the conspiracy (Sall. Cat. 49.2; Plut. Caes. 7.3). Gruen 1974, 60, 66, 80, 286, dis-
cusses this Piso’s opposition to Pompey and Caesar. Cn. Piso’s grandfather went to Spain 
in 65 b.c.e. as quaestor pro praetore to reduce the influence of Pompey in that province 
(Sall. Cat. 19.1–5; CIL 12 2.749 = ILS 875; see Seager 2002, 65–66). Cn. Piso’s father chose 
the side of Brutus and Cassius over Caesar (Tac. Ann. 2.43.2).
description of Piso as adiutor to the prince seems to make too much of 
the term. If anything, the word was probably invoked by Tacitus and the 
SCPP to intensify the appearance of Piso’s guilt: he had been expected 
to “help” Germanicus, but instead worked against the prince and rejoiced 
at his death. 
While there is no good evidence that Piso was a close friend and 
agent of the emperor, or that amicus and adiutor were meant to express 
such a relationship, there is substantial evidence to suggest that he was 
actually antagonistic towards the imperial regime, and to Tiberius in 
particular. In the first place, Piso was not merely a senator of consular 
status; he belonged to one of Rome’s most prestigious surviving clans 
and was immensely proud of his glittering Republican heritage. In the 
aftermath of the civil wars that had exterminated so many aristocratic 
clans, the Calpurnii Pisones stood out as being one of the oldest and most 
“Republican” families that survived.35 A common trait of this family seems 
to have been its resistance to dynasts: Piso’s grandfather and great-uncle 
had both been fierce opponents of Caesar and Pompey, and his father 
had been a strong supporter of Brutus and Cassius.36 As Cooley (1998, 
203) has pointed out: “the immediate family of Piso pater had a history 
of causing trouble for the powers at Rome.” Piso’s father had returned 
to Rome after the defeat of Brutus and Cassius and the collapse of the 
Republican cause, but he shunned the dynasts and rebuffed overtures 
from Augustus until long after the Battle of Actium. This Piso relented 
only eight years later, eventually accepting Augustus’ invitation that they 
hold the consulship jointly in 23 b.c.e. (Tac. Ann. 2.43.2). Syme is surely 
right that this Piso only accepted the emperor’s offer because it served 
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37 Syme 1984, 368. Syme elsewhere (1939, 368) suggests that Piso may have accepted 
out of “disinterested patriotism.”
38 Syme 1939, 382, n. 9. 
his own ends: after his long retirement and refusal to cooperate with the 
imperial regime, he accepted a joint consulship with the emperor in order 
to refurbish the dignitas of his family and secure consulships for his two 
sons.37 The promotion of the gens Calpurnia from plebeian to patrician 
status may have been part of the price the emperor paid to acquire this 
Piso’s public support.38 Augustus wanted to heal a state that had long 
been fractured by civil war, but he also needed the senatorial elite—and 
most particularly the surviving nobiles—to accept and support his regime, 
and he could use his extensive resources to induce these important men 
to join him. As Syme notes (1939, 368): “the master of patronage could 
attach to his cause even the most recalcitrant of the nobiles.” A personal 
offer from the emperor to share the consulship of 23 b.c.e. enabled Piso’s 
father to renew and increase the prestige and importance of his family, 
but this need not indicate that he felt any friendship or loyalty towards 
the imperial house, nor does it necessitate that his son would have felt 
any gratitude or friendship towards Augustus’ stepson Tiberius. 
Piso (cos. 7 b.c.e.) seems to have inherited his family’s fierce 
Republicanism and hostility towards the imperial regime. Not only does 
Tacitus describe him as “temperamentally violent and a stranger to 
compliance, with the innate defiance of his father” (Ann. 2.43.2–3), but 
also he records Piso’s challenging Tiberius publicly on several occasions, 
demonstrating little regard or gratitude for Augustus’ promotion of his 
father. Furthermore, Piso undermined the emperor with this defiance at 
a time when Tiberius was new to imperial rule and needed to consolidate 
his position. In 15 c.e., when Tiberius was incensed at the allegation that 
Granius Marcellus had (among other things) removed Augustus’ head 
from statues and replaced it with an image of Tiberius, the emperor 
declared that he would express his own opinion openly and on oath, 
knowing that this would compel the other senators to agree with him 
and convict Marcellus (Ann. 1.74.1–6). In response, Piso embarrassed 
the emperor by objecting that his tremendous influence over the cowed 
senators would prevent them from voting freely, a clear statement that 
the emperor’s participation would subvert justice. Tacitus calls Piso’s defi-
ance a reminder of dying liberty (vestigia morientis libertatis) and says 
that Tiberius, shaken (permotus) by the challenge, allowed Marcellus to 
be acquitted of the charge of treason (although he still had to answer a 
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39 Because Shotter 1974, 233, accepts that Tiberius and Piso were friends, he dismisses 
this as an unimportant event and believes the emperor was neither angry nor resentful, but 
this seems difficult to accept given the public nature of the rebuke, and given that it came 
so early in Tiberius’ reign when he was particularly vulnerable to criticism.
40 Bird 1987, 73, seems to agree that Tiberius was displeased with the decisive inde-
pendence of the senate in this matter, although he cautions that the emperor would have 
been displeased with more senators than just Piso on this occasion. 
41 To reconcile this episode with his assumption that Piso and Tiberius were friends, 
Shotter 1974, 233, suggests that Piso was actually championing Tiberius’ own feelings that 
the senate should not adjourn in his absence, in which case it seems strange that Tiberius—
who was present during the debate—did not indicate this preference that would have given 
honor to the senate as an independent body. Bird 1987, 73, suggests Tiberius did not speak 
because he was new as emperor and wanted free debate in the senate, which is possible (if 
based upon a guess at what Tiberius was thinking) but does not diminish the fact that Piso 
was openly arguing for the emperor’s insignificance to senatorial activity.
42 Shotter 1974, 234, tries to explain Piso’s actions differently, seeing him “as a frank 
and firm senator, whose standing with Tiberius was such that he could speak up without 
incurring wrath,” but this depends entirely upon the tenuous assumption that the two men 
were actually close enough as friends that the emperor could forgive such public affronts. 
As argued above, however, there is no good evidence for their friendship, and Piso’s actions 
seem quite antagonistic: he had repeatedly challenged Tiberius in public before the senate, 
charge of extortion).39 For Piso to rebuff the emperor in this way, publicly 
before the senate, and to prevent him from speaking when he clearly 
wanted to, does not seem the act of a friend and ally. 
Piso openly challenged the emperor a second time the following year 
(16 c.e.) when he pushed the senate to reject Tiberius’ wish that all citizens 
practicing astrology should be exiled from the city (Dio 57.15.7–9). In 
direct opposition to Tiberius and Drusus, Piso urged the senate to protect 
these citizens, and his motion carried the day against the emperor until 
a tribune interposed his veto to prevent any interference with Tiberius’ 
wishes. Piso’s defiant opposition surprised Dio, who called this challenge 
to imperial authority a particularly good demonstration of democratic 
government (τὸ τῆς δημοκρατίας σχῆμα).40 In that same year, Piso showed 
his disregard for Tiberius a third time. When the emperor announced 
that he would be absent from the senate for a period in the near future, 
Piso insisted that public business in the senate should continue in spite of 
Tiberius’ absence, and argued against those who believed the emperor’s 
presence was necessary for the senate’s distinction and dignity (Tac. Ann. 
2.35.1–2). Tacitus thought that this public show of scorn for the emperor 
was striking, and he referred to it as an unusual example of free speech 
under the imperial regime (species libertatis).41 While any one of these 
public challenges to the emperor might be explained away,42 three such 
challenges in rapid succession do not seem the work of a friend and ally. 
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and he had done so in the early years of Tiberius’ reign when it was essential for the new 
emperor to consolidate his position and gather support and receive deference in the senate.
43 Allen 1948 points out a tradition among the Calpurnii Pisones of retreating from 
public service when confronted with a tyrannical government.
44 Goodyear 1981, 2.370, calls Piso’s outburst “anachronistic . . . as well as grossly 
offensive.”
Tiberius, therefore, cannot have been under the illusion that Piso 
was his friend and supporter. Just one year before Piso was assigned to 
Syria, his brother L. Calpurnius Piso “Augur” (cos. 1 b.c.e.) had publicly 
condemned the state of public affairs and tried to quit the senate in 
disgust, forcing the still-new emperor Tiberius to entreat the prestigious 
nobilis not to abandon the government altogether (Tac. Ann. 2.34.1).43 
Smarting from this embarrassment, the emperor could not reasonably 
expect that L. Calpurnius Piso’s brother was a loyal friend to the impe-
rial regime. Not only had Cn. Piso insulted Tiberius before the senate; 
his first recorded action after accepting the governorship of Syria was to 
undermine the authority of the imperial regime by scolding Germanicus 
before the Athenians, and he later berated the Nabataeans for presenting 
Germanicus with regal honors by complaining that the prince was “the 
son of the Roman princeps, not that of the Parthian king” (Tac. Ann. 
2.57.4).44 Taken altogether, there seems to be ample evidence that Piso 
was no loyal friend and supporter of the emperor, and the only sugges-
tion to the contrary appears in the unverifiable rumors that Tacitus puts 
into the mouths of others. Given the clear evidence of Piso’s resentment 
and opposition to Tiberius, it seems unsound to accept Tacitus’ innuendo 
that the two men were friends and allies; the unfriendliness that Tacitus 
reports as fact should be given more credence than the friendship that 
is only reported through rumor and inference. If anything, Piso was 
ideologically opposed to the imperial regime and deeply resentful that 
an aristocrat of his lineage and prestige had to show deference to men 
like Tiberius and Germanicus. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Tiberius 
would have been so foolish as to think he could trust Piso, especially with 
the command of heavily armed Syria and the extremely sensitive task of 
watching and restraining Germanicus. 
This brings us back to the original conundrum: since Piso was 
neither a friend nor an agent of the emperor, and since he could not 
have acted as a restraining force on Germanicus even if this task had 
been assigned to him, why was he entrusted with the prestigious and 
strategically critical province of Syria? If we remove the misdirection 
caused by Tacitus’ innuendo of a conspiracy, a more likely explanation 
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45 Tac. Ann. 1.5.3–4 (Livia), 1.31.1 (revolt), 1.12.1–13.6 (senators), and see above on 
L. Calpurnius Piso “Augur.”
46 Syme 1939, 373.
47 In particular, Augustus appointed L. Piso urban prefect (praefectus urbi), a Repub-
lican office that Augustus had revived periodically during his rule, but one that became 
permanent with L. Piso’s appointment at an unknown date (Tac. Ann. 6.11.3). See Syme 
1939, 403–4.
is at hand that fits our evidence better: Tiberius may have offered Piso 
the Syrian command as part of a political deal to win over the support 
of the troublesome  senator. Tiberius had good reasons to do this: he was 
still relatively new to imperial rule at the time and faced the challenge of 
being the first person to “inherit” the principate (his mother Livia had 
been sufficiently worried about his succession that she had suppressed 
news of Augustus’ death and posted guard detachments), he was less 
popular than his predecessor, the northern legions had revolted upon 
his accession, several senators had questioned the handling of his suc-
cession, and aristocratic sentiment remained bad enough that in 16 c.e., 
L. Calpurnius Piso “Augur” (Cn. Piso’s brother) attempted to abandon 
public life altogether in protest of the poor state of public affairs, which 
forced the emperor to take the embarrassing step of beseeching L. Piso 
to remain in Rome and continue to attend senate meetings, lest the 
retirement of so prestigious an aristocrat be taken as a rebuke of the 
emperor’s rule.45 Tiberius, therefore, had good reasons to shore up his 
support among Rome’s aristocracy, and winning over Cn. Piso with a 
considerable beneficium such as command of the province of Syria was a 
shrewd idea. Piso was a blueblood from the Republic, and his dignitas and 
ancestral heritage made him a most desirable ally for the new emperor, 
especially if it meant silencing Piso’s defiant comments in the senate. In 
doing this, Tiberius was adopting Augustus’ tactic of incorporating recalci-
trant senators, especially from the among the Calpurnii Pisones: not only 
had Augustus convinced Piso’s father to share the consulship with him 
in 23 b.c.e., but much more recently—perhaps only a few years before 
his death in 14 c.e.—he had persuaded L. Calpurnius Piso “Pontifex” 
to lend his famous name and ancestral dignitas to the imperial regime 
in exchange for considerable inducements.46 This had been a significant 
coup for Augustus, who thereafter paraded the prestigious nobilis as a 
prominent ornament of his regime.47 Tiberius understood very well the 
value of the Calpurnii Pisones to the regime, which is why he had gone 
to great lengths to prevent the senator L. Piso “Augur” from carrying out 
his threat to abandon public life. Indeed, this process of winning back 
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48 Saller 1982, 74–78, demonstrated the tendency of emperors in the early empire to 
allow their supporters to “broker” imperial beneficia to further increase their support among 
the aristocracy. Thus an emperor might bind an ally more tightly to himself by allowing 
that ally to suggest other ways the emperor might hand out beneficia. 
49 Augustus had normally employed “new men” or men from lesser senatorial families 
as legates for Syria because they lacked the requisite dignitas and auctoritas to challenge his 
preeminence in Rome and his hold over the legions, as Dabrowa 1998, 17–32, points out: L. 
Licinius Varro (gov. ca. 25–23 b.c.e.); M. Titius (gov. ca. 13. 10 b.c.e.); C. Sentius Saturninus 
(gov. ca. 10. 7 b.c.e.); Quinctilius Varus (gov. ca. 7. 4 b.c.e.); L. Volusius Saturninus (gov. ca. 
4–6 c.e.); and P. Sulpicius Quirinius (gov. ca. 6 c.e.). 
50 L. Calpurnius Piso’s governorship of Syria is disputed but likely (see Syme 1986, 
337–41).
one brother (L. Piso) may have given Tiberius the idea to offer the other 
brother (Cn. Piso) a great province in the hopes of binding him to the 
imperial house, or Piso “Augur” may have requested a great command 
for his brother as part of his agreement to remain in public life.48 Tiberius 
had still other reasons for thinking that Cn. Piso was a good choice for 
recruitment: his kinsman L. Calpurnius Piso “Pontifex” still served as 
urban prefect and was a loyal supporter of the regime (and a particular 
friend of Tiberius), and Cn. Piso’s wife Plancina was a close friend of 
Tiberius’ mother, the empress Livia. All these factors, therefore, probably 
convinced Tiberius that it was worth his time to try and win over Piso 
with the offer of a great command, since doing so could silence his most 
pernicious critic and add a prestigious nobilis to his list of supporters. 
The offer of Syria was quite an inducement, since most Roman 
senators would hope in vain for such a province. Perhaps the great-
est command in the empire, the governor of Syria commanded a huge 
army of four legions—twice the size of the normal consular army in the 
Republic—and it offered the real possibility of winning military glory if 
the Parthians attacked. Furthermore, this command was in the Greek 
East, a favorite locale among Rome’s aristocracy for its many historic 
and luxurious cities. In addition, Syria was far away and communication 
between Rome and Antioch was difficult and dependent upon sailing 
conditions, which ensured that the commander of Syria could expect to 
enjoy considerable independence. Because of its many military resources 
and advantages, Syria was rarely entrusted to any senator of great lineage 
and auctoritas unless the emperor had a compelling reason for doing so.49 
In fact, the only two great nobiles known to have held command of Syria 
had linked themselves with the imperial house: the urban prefect L. Cal-
purnius Piso “Pontifex” and Germanicus’ in-law Q. Metellus Creticus 
Silanus.50 Whereas these two nobiles were known to be loyal supporters 
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51 Woodman and Martin 1996, 141, point out that this is the only occasion in Tacitus’ 
Annals where an emperor seeks a senatorial decree appointing an imperial legate, although 
it cannot be known whether Tacitus was following an official report (such as the SCPP) or 
whether he added the phrase on his own. They note that the phrase may be intended to imply 
that the senate shared responsibility for the debacle that resulted from Piso’s governorship.
52 Augustus used lieutenants (legati) with the title pro praetore to govern imperial 
provinces, whereas the senate appointed proconsuls (ex-praetors and ex-consuls acting pro 
consule) to command the public provinces (Suet. Aug. 47.1; Strabo 17.3.25; Dio 53.12.4–5). 
of the imperial house, Tacitus makes it very clear that Cn. Piso was no 
friend of the emperor before his appointment to Syria. If anything, Piso 
had been one of the emperor’s most outspoken critics in the early years 
of his rule, so Tiberius’ decision to appoint him to Syria must mean that 
the two men came to some understanding about Piso’s future support for 
the regime, or at least the emperor believed they had come to such an 
understanding. Although no source confirms that this was the emperor’s 
intention, there is much to recommend this reconstruction, whereas Taci-
tus’ innuendo that Tiberius and Piso were close friends and were united 
in a conspiracy against the popular young prince is easily disproven by 
Tacitus’ own narrative. 
If there was indeed a secret plan between Tiberius and Piso, there-
fore, it probably had nothing to do with Germanicus, but rather was an 
agreement that—in exchange for the command of Syria—Piso would 
cease from public criticism of the emperor. Despite his previous hostility 
towards the imperial house, there were several reasons why Piso would 
accept this deal. First, since command of Syria was rarely given to a 
great nobilis, receiving this province would enhance Piso’s status and 
dignitas even higher above his senatorial rivals. Second, since Syria was 
far off in the East, Piso would substantially be his own master once he 
assumed command in the province. Since Syria was an imperial prov-
ince, Piso would technically be a lieutenant of the emperor (a legatus 
Augusti pro praetore) rather than an independent governor of a public 
province (a proconsul), but this distinction waned in light of the great 
power and prestige that came from holding Syria. Third, Tiberius took the 
strange and apparently unique step of increasing the honor and prestige 
of Piso’s commission by having it confirmed by the Senate (Tac. Ann. 
3.12.1).51 The emperor certainly did not need the approval of the senate 
to appoint legates to his provinces, so he probably intended to give Piso 
the satisfaction of receiving his command from the senate, which might 
have soothed any discomfort the proud senator had about being a legatus 
Augusti pro praetore instead of a proper proconsul.52 Indeed, the highly 
unusual senatorial confirmation may have been intended to obfuscate the 
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53 Tiberius is not known to have exercised personal command over the eastern legions 
for thirty-six years, since his Armenian campaign in 20 b.c.e. (Suet. Aug. 21.3; Tib. 9.1). 
Cooley 1998, 203, suggests that Piso may indeed have secretly hoped to seize power at Rome. 
54 See Rowe 2002, 165. Agrippa was sent to the East in 23 and 16 b.c.e. (Jos. Ant. 
15.10.2, 16.2.1–5; Dio 53.32.1), and Gaius Caesar in 1 b.c.e. (Plin. HN 6.141; Suet. Tib. 12.2; 
Dio 55.10.18–19).
line between legate and proconsul. Finally, if Piso were even considering 
the possibility, Syria offered the best opportunity and resources to raise 
a revolt against Tiberius and his regime.
This last possibility may have been in Tiberius’ mind as well. The 
chance of gaining the support of a nobilis like Piso was a tempting prize 
for Tiberius, but it was also a risk to give such a powerful province to a 
prestigious senator whose loyalty to Tiberius was uncertain. A man of 
Piso’s lineage and auctoritas might win over the support of Syria’s legions 
and start a revolt, especially since Tiberius was a new emperor, was far 
away, and was not as well known to the eastern legions as he was to those 
stationed in Germany.53 Piso was an asset worth acquiring, and his many 
connections with the imperial family surely gave Tiberius hope that the 
recalcitrant senator could (like other members of his clan) be brought 
around to supporting the regime. Even so, the cautious Tiberius probably 
would not have taken the risk of giving Piso unrestrained access to Syria’s 
four legions had not administrative problems in several eastern provinces 
presented him with a safeguard. According to Tacitus (Ann. 2.42.4–43.1), 
a number of high-level problems in the East required the presence of a 
member of the imperial house: Cappadocia needed to be converted into 
a Roman province; the deaths of the kings of Commagene and Cilicia 
had created local disputes over whether the regions should remain inde-
pendent kingdoms or should be incorporated into the Roman Empire as 
provinces; Syria and Judaea were asking for tax relief; and the unstable 
political situation in Armenia needed to be monitored and evaluated. 
Tiberius, therefore, had the senate give Germanicus an extraordinary 
command over the East with imperium maius to deal with these problems, 
which was in keeping with precedents established by Augustus. In one 
aspect, however, Tiberius departed from Augustan policy: he kept Piso as 
his legate in Syria. When Augustus had given Agrippa (and later, Gaius) 
extraordinary eastern commands, he had not appointed a legate to Syria.54 
Presumably, immediate supervision and command of Syria was part of 
the provincia assigned to Agrippa (and Gaius), which makes sense given 
that Syria was the most powerful province in the Roman East. Tiberius 
broke with this practice by having Piso as his legate in Syria at the same 
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time that Germanicus was holding an extraordinary eastern command. 
Rowe (2002, 165) points out that this was the first and last time until 
63 c.e. that an emperor appointed a legate to Syria while an extraordi-
nary commander was holding the entire East with imperium maius. It 
is possible that—because Piso had already received his appointment by 
the time that Germanicus was assigned to the East—Tiberius did not 
want to insult Piso by withdrawing or postponing his Syrian command, 
but if this was the case, then the overlap of Piso and Germanicus in the 
East was simply an accidental occurrence, which does not seem likely 
given the importance of the two commands (and the two commanders). 
Tiberius (a very experienced commander) certainly took both provincial 
assignments into consideration, so his departure from Augustan practice 
must have been intentional; he wanted Germanicus and Piso to be in the 
East at the same time.
The traditional view would say Tiberius sent both men to the East 
because he wanted Piso to control and limit Germanicus’ ambitions, but 
as the preceding pages have shown, the evidence clearly demonstrates 
that Piso was no friend and ally to the emperor, that he had no authority 
or ability to control the prince, and that he consistently acted contrary to 
the emperor’s best interests. In this light, Tiberius must have sent both 
men to the East because he wanted Germanicus to keep an eye on Piso. 
The evidence supports this reconstruction well, in particular the nature 
of their assignments. Although Germanicus was given a command that 
encompassed all eastern provinces, the specific problems he was sent to 
resolve were almost entirely outside of Syria, meaning he was expected 
to spend most of his time away from Syria and from Piso. Furthermore, 
since Germanicus’ responsibilities were mainly financial and organiza-
tional, there was little reason to suspect that he would have to interfere 
in Piso’s command of Syria’s legions (although he had the authority to 
do so). This separation in their assignments is telling: Piso could not 
possibly have interfered in Germanicus’ exercise of authority, since the 
prince had imperium maius and Piso had no authority outside of Syria. 
On the other hand, Germanicus could easily intervene into Piso’s admin-
istration of Syria and his command of the Syrian legions, both because 
he had imperium maius, and because his provincia included Syria. Thus 
Germanicus was expected to spend most of his time outside of Syria 
(allowing Piso autonomy of command), but he was well placed (and 
authorized) to intervene in Syria, whereas Piso had little ability to have 
an influence on the prince’s command. This was an elegant solution for 
Tiberius: he could honor Piso with an important command, send Germani-
cus to resolve important problems throughout the East, and—if Piso’s 
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55 Tac. Ann. 2.57.3, 2.69.1. Goodyear 1981, 2.367, notes that Germanicus’ mild reply 
to Piso at their first unfriendly encounter (Tac. Ann. 2.57.2) may indicate that the prince 
was uncertain about how the emperor wished the legate treated.
56 Germanicus did indeed spend much time touring Asia and Egypt (Tac. Ann. 
2.54.1–55.3). Mierow 1943, 146, points out that Germanicus was expected to spend most 
of his time in Armenia.
activities turned seditious—the emperor could count on his adopted son 
and heir to defend the imperial house (and his own future empire) from 
any threat. This is indeed what happened: Germanicus endured Piso’s 
rude behavior so long as it posed no real threat to the imperial house, 
but the prince did not hesitate to step in when Piso’s activities became 
potentially treacherous.55 With a loyal relative and heir in command of 
the East to keep an eye on things, Tiberius could safely offer Piso the 
large and prestigious military command of Syria in hopes of winning the 
support of this persistent critic. 
The importance and prestige of Syria, and the honor of receiving 
the imperial province with senatorial confirmation, induced Piso to accept 
the command, but the subsequent news that Germanicus would receive 
an extraordinary command over the East must have come as a bitter pill. 
Piso probably consoled himself that Germanicus’ mission was primarily 
financial and would force the prince to spend almost all of his time review-
ing tax systems and administrative structures in provinces other than Syria, 
but the legate was no doubt angry at this development and soon began 
lashing out against the prince. There is no evidence that Germanicus was 
expected to assume command of Syria’s legions for military activities, 
and Piso may have expected the prince to spend his leisure time touring 
the luxurious cities throughout the East (as he in fact did).56 Thus Piso 
probably hoped (or even expected) to be left alone in his command of 
Syria, and planned to ignore Germanicus’ presence in the East as much 
as possible. Of course, his hope of having a free rein was later crushed 
when the prince did indeed appear in the province, and Piso’s anger over 
the development led him to be more and more insubordinate, throwing 
fuel on his already-strained relationship with Germanicus. 
Sending Germanicus to keep an eye on Piso was a good idea, but 
events proved that the two men were incapable of working together, 
and their differences became insurmountable. Tacitus portrays this as 
being entirely Piso’s fault: the Syrian governor had always resented the 
young prince, and this resentment turned into the open hostility and 
gross insubordination discussed above. On the other hand, it is also 
likely that Germanicus did not tread as carefully as he might have done 
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57 The SCPP (26–27) praises Germanicus’ patience in the face of Piso’s hostility and 
insubordination.
58 There were two occasions when Piso clearly and specifically refused to obey Ger-
manicus or countermanded his orders: in 18 c.e., Piso refused to bring units of the Syrian 
legions to Germanicus in Armenia (Tac. Ann. 2.57.1); and in 19 c.e., Piso reversed all of 
Germanicus’ acta in Syria while the prince was away in Egypt (Tac. Ann. 2.69.1). 
59 As Seager 2005, 88, points out, Piso’s insubordinate action “is comprehensible—it 
was after all Piso’s army and Piso’s province—yet pointlessly provocative, since when 
Germanicus returned to Syria he could once more overrule Piso, whose chief purpose was 
probably just to restore his self-esteem.” 
to protect Piso’s honor and dignitas. Although Germanicus was loyal 
to the emperor, he was probably unwilling or unable to tolerate Piso’s 
arrogant behavior, and he did not allow Piso unimpeded exercise of 
authority in Syria, either because the prince’s official duties necessitated 
that he operate to some degree in that province, or because he wished to 
humble the haughty governor. Still, Germanicus was surprisingly tolerant 
of Piso’s outbursts, perhaps because he was aware of Tiberius’ motive 
for assigning Piso to Syria and, therefore, did his best to tolerate Piso’s 
insults in the knowledge that doing so helped his adoptive father gain 
the support of an important nobilis.57 Germanicus’ friends were outraged 
by Piso’s disrespectful and insubordinate behavior and sought to have 
him humbled, but the prince refrained from doing so for a long period, 
which suggests that he was deliberately showing Piso more indulgence 
than could normally be expected for one who treated an imperial prince 
so insolently (Tac. Ann. 2.57.4). At some point, however, Germanicus ran 
out of patience, perhaps because Piso’s insubordination had expanded 
to countermanding Germanicus’ instructions to the legions and to urban 
governments in the East.58 These acts may have smacked far more of 
treason than of mere personal enmity to Germanicus, who thereupon 
took immediate steps to intervene in Piso’s administration and to take 
greater control of affairs in Syria. 
According to Tacitus (Ann. 2.57.3–58.2, 69.1), Germanicus intruded 
into Piso’s dealings with foreign kingdoms (especially Armenia), and 
began intervening in the military and civilian affairs throughout Syria. 
From Piso’s perspective, these actions were a humiliation that amounted to 
being stripped of his command by a young man many years his junior—a 
man whom Piso rated as having less dignitas than he.59 When Germanicus’ 
intrusions proved too much for Piso to bear, he left his province in protest, 
no doubt believing that Germanicus had deprived him of his command 
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60 Goodyear 1981, 2.362–63, makes the unsupported but intriguing suggestion that 
Piso may have suffered a mental breakdown. Although there is no evidence for this, it 
would certainly help demonstrate the seriousness of Piso’s expectations and his horror at 
having those expectations ruined by the interference of Germanicus. It is not difficult to 
imagine that Piso’s self-importance made him unable to cope with playing second fiddle 
to the young prince. On the other hand, Shotter 2004, 44, suggests that Piso may simply 
have been unintelligent. 
61 Tac. Ann. 6.27.2–3 (cf. Hist. 2.65.1–2). For further discussion, see Drogula 2011 
(esp. 251–52).
(Tac. Ann. 2.69.2, 70.2).60 Tacitus obfuscates this detail by including an 
otherwise unsubstantiated report that Germanicus ordered Piso out of the 
province, but this is contradicted by the SCPP, which specifically blames 
Piso for leaving his province (SCPP 48–49; Ann. 2.70.2). The very fact that 
Piso abandoned his province to Germanicus is ample evidence that his 
primary concern was not to counsel or restrain the prince, but rather to 
serve his own interests, which did not necessarily mirror the interests of 
the emperor. Indeed, Tacitus may have included the erroneous report that 
Piso was ordered out of the province to provide an alternate explanation 
for Piso’s departure, one that did not undermine Tacitus’ insinuation that 
Piso was supposed to be the friend and agent of the emperor. 
Germanicus’ sudden and unexpected death was the catalyst that 
turned a bad situation into a debacle, since it induced Piso to start a civil 
war in his effort to reclaim command of Syria. This disaster seems to have 
shaken Tiberius and changed his policies regarding provincial commands; 
whereas he had originally been willing to follow Augustan practice of win-
ning over nobiles like Piso with important commands, henceforth a certain 
degree of paranoia entered his provincial policy. For example, the next 
legate Tiberius appointed to Syria was Aelius Lamia (in 21/22 c.e.), but 
the emperor did not permit Aelius to leave Rome and take up his com-
mand in person. For ten years, Aelius remained the governor of Syria, but 
he commanded the province from Rome through legates.61 L. Arruntius 
was likewise compelled to govern Spain from Rome through legates for 
ten years, perhaps because of the large army of three legions stationed 
in Spain. Thus Piso’s behavior in Syria had convinced Tiberius to be far 
more cautious in assigning military commands, and he adopted a policy 
of leaving trusted men in their provinces for long periods, abandoning his 
early attempt to use provincial commands to win over new supporters. 
Yet the situation might have been far worse if Germanicus and his loyal 
lieutenants had not been present in the East to intervene when Piso’s 
activities began to seem treacherous. If we set aside the bias and innuendo 
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62 I am deeply grateful to Elizabeth A. Meyer, J. E. Lendon, A. J. Woodman, and the 
anonymous readers at AJP for reading drafts of this article and providing me with com-
ments, suggestions, and criticisms.
in Tacitus’ account, it does not seem possible that Piso was a loyal sup-
porter, lieutenant, and co-conspirator of the emperor. If Tiberius trusted 
anyone in the East, it was Germanicus, whose extraordinary command 
may well have included keeping an eye on Piso.
Syme (1986, 341) once noted that Syria was not only a provincial 
command of “signal importance,” but further that, “if a prince of the 
dynasty went to the eastern lands, the selection of the legate became a 
delicate matter.” If Piso was not a loyal supporter of the emperor, and 
was not sent to check the ambitions of Germanicus as Tacitus implies, 
then why was such an arrogant nobilis and outspoken critic of the impe-
rial regime given the outstanding privilege of holding one of the greatest 
military commands in the Roman Empire? The evidence suggests a very 
plausible answer: Tiberius hoped to “purchase” Piso’s loyalty and sup-
port by giving him the province of Syria. To minimize the risk, Tiberius 
gave Piso the province at a time when his trusted and capable adopted 
son Germanicus would be holding an extraordinary command in the 
East with imperium maius. The prince was sent to the East to resolve a 
number of major financial and organizational problems, but his proximity 
to Syria provided a safeguard against the possibility of insurrection. The 
emperor’s plan to win over the support of Piso failed, but Piso’s effort 
to retake Syria by force after Germanicus’ death may indicate that he 
did indeed harbor rebellious thoughts, and that the prince had been right 
to intervene. In short, Germanicus may have done exactly what Tiberius 
expected him to do: keep an eye on Piso and intervene, if necessary, to 
protect the security of the Julio-Claudian regime.62
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